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REVISITING THE JUDGE-MADE RULE OF
NON-INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL COMPANY
MATTERS
JEAN J DU PLESSIS*
Professor of Law, Deakin University, Australia
I INTRODUCTION
When one looks at several of the judge-made rules applied to the internal
governance arrangements of companies, at first glance they seem very logical
and indispensible to company law. Examples of these rules are: the rule of
non-interference in internal company matters by the courts; the rule that
courts will not take over the responsibility to manage the business of
companies; the rule that courts will not second-guess the business decisions
taken by the board of directors; the rule that the courts should respect the
outcome of decisions taken by the majority of shareholders (the so-called
majority rule); and that the company, as a separate legal entity, is the proper
plaintiff when it comes to wrongs committed against the company (the
so-called rule in Foss v Harbottle).
Superficially, some of these rules seem unrelated, and they seem to exist
harmoniously, but a closer analysis reveals considerable overlaps between the
rules, and even tensions between them. These overlaps and tensions only
become apparent when the question is asked why the courts developed these
rules. It is, however, a daunting task to identify trends and patterns as the
courts, over a period of almost 200 years, have provided different explana-
tions for the existence of some of these judge-made rules or, in some
instances, have not provided clear explanations for developing them at all.
In this article the focus will be primarily on the judge-made rule of
non-interference in internal company matters, but reference to other related
judge-made company law rules is unavoidable. In section 2 of this article an
in-depth analysis of some older, primarily English, cases will be undertaken.
In section 3 the focus will be on some qualifications required of the rule that
courts will not interfere with internal company matters.
In the discussion it will be seen that some of the judge-made rules still
applied today were developed almost 200 years ago. However, these rules,
and the cases in which they were laid down, retain their importance, even
with a new South African Companies Act (the Companies Act 71 of 2008)
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having been promulgated. As the courts are required to exercise a value
judgement on whether or not to interfere in internal company matters, the
courts will have to revisit the origin of the judge-made rule of non-
interference in internal company matters. There is also no indication in the
new CompaniesAct 71 of 2008 that any of these judge-made rules have been
abolished or codified to any extent that would make them irrelevant or
inapplicable in the modern company law context in South Africa. Thus, it
remains important to discuss and analyse these rules.
II TENSION AMONG JUDGE-MADE RULES OF INTERNAL
COMPANY GOVERNANCE
(a) General rules
Two judge-made rules that have been commented on by a few commenta-
tors are, first, that courts are reluctant to interfere with the internal affairs of
companies and, secondly, that courts will not second-guess the decisions
properly taken by directors as part of powers conferred upon the directors by
the articles of association.1 It is, however, far more difficult to draw an exact
distinction between the two rules, or even to pin-point the exact reasons for
the existence of each of the two rules. This is difficult because the courts have
neither been consistent in the way in which they have expressed these two
rules, nor in giving their reasons why the rules were fundamental to company
law.
(b) Case studies
(i) One of the earliest reported cases: Carlen v Drury (1812)
One of the earliest cases where the issue for consideration was whether or not
a court of law should interfere in the internal managerial affairs of business-
men (the exact business form — a partnership or joint stock company — is
somewhat uncertain)2 was the 1812 case of Carlen v Drury.3 The case was
brought by six committee members on behalf of themselves and the other
members of the business enterprise, against three managers, six of whom
were also committee members. The bill alleged ‘Circumstances of gross
Mismanagement, and Neglect on the Part of the Managers ; and praying an
Account ; a Dissolution of the Partnership ; that a Receiver might be
appointed . . .’.4
1 Jean J du Plessis ‘Directors’ duty to use their powers for proper or permissible
purposes’ (2004) 16 SA Merc LJ 308 at 312; Elizabeth Klein & Jean J du Plessis
‘Corporate donations, the best interest of the company and the proper purpose doc-
trine’ (2005) 28 University of New South Wales LR 69 at 74; and C G Killian and J J du
Plessis ‘Possible remedies for shareholders when a company refuses to declare divi-
dends or declare inadequate dividends’2005TSAR 48 at 56.
2 SeeCarlen v Drury 35 ER 61 at 63.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
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The Lord Chancellor [Eldon] pointed out that the business was conducted
under internal rules (‘Terms of the Articles’) agreed upon by the parties who
formed the business. The court made it clear that if these rules were not
effectual, the court would interfere. However, in this case there were specific
arrangements made for resolving internal disputes. It was pointed out that the
court would only be prepared to interfere with internal managerial matters
entrusted to the managers if a ‘case of Breach of Engagement, or Abuse of
Trust’ is established ‘to the perfect Satisfaction of the Court’. It will then have
to be established ‘that Persons will not according to their Duty attend to the
Interest of the Concern’. After all, as the court pointed out, it ‘is not to be
required of [the court] on every occasion to take the Management of every
Playhouse and Brewhouse in the Kingdom’.5 The Lord Chancellor then
made it clear that parties should first rely on their own internal mechanisms
to resolve their difference before approaching the court. The strongest
indication of when the court would be prepared to interfere with the internal
affairs of a business enterprise appears from the following words:
‘If, however, a Case of Delinquency [of the managers] should be clearly made
out, I do not hesitate to declare, the Court would act : but there must be a
positive Necessity for the Interference of the Court, arising from the Refusal or
Neglect of the Committee to act. That may raise a case for prompt and
immediate Interference; which I cannot say exists at present.’6
Thus, Carlen v Drury is probably the earliest case where the court did not
only state that a court will not interfere in the internal affairs of a company,
but where a court specifically focused on the exceptions to this rule. It is
probably also the first case where a court accentuated so prominently that it is
impossible for a court to manage the internal affairs of companies.
(ii) Foss v Harbottle (1843) and Mozley v Alston (1847)
The two cases most often quoted in the context of the importance of
majority rule in company law, and the reluctance of courts to judge the
merits of internal company disputes unless internal dispute resolution
mechanisms have first been exhausted, are two cases decided in 1843 and
1847 respectively. They are the cases of Foss v Harbottle7 andMozley v Alston.8
In Foss v Harbottle9 the plaintiff instituted action on behalf of himself and
other shareholders against, inter alia, the five directors of the company, three
of whom were bankrupt. It was alleged that the defendants were involved in
several fraudulent and illegal transactions. The plaintiffs approached the
court, rather than relying on internal remedies and procedures available
under the company constitution, because they alleged there was not a
sufficient number of qualified directors to constitute a board and that the
5 Ibid at 62.
6 Ibid at 63.
7 67 ER 189.
8 41 ER 833.
9 Supra note 7.
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company had no clerk. The plaintiffs requested the court to decree the
defendants to make good to the company the losses and expenses caused by
several alleged fraudulent and illegal acts of the defendants. The court held
that the plaintiffs had no standing because, under these circumstances, there
was nothing to prevent the company itself from instituting the action based
on the complaints raised by the plaintiffs.
It is interesting to note that the defendants, specifically to avoid ‘the
responsibilities of an ordinary partnership’, applied for a private Act of
Parliament — to be granted the privilege to trade as a company. This Act had
been granted on 5 May 1837 (7 Will 4) and, under this Act, ‘The Victoria
Park Company’, a typical property development company, was founded.10
In terms of this Act, the company was granted all the important virtues of a
body corporate, namely: ‘perpetual succession’; to hold a ‘common seal’; to
‘sue and be sued, plead or be impleaded, at law and in equity’ in the name of
the company; to ‘prosecute any bill or bills of indictment or information
against any person or persons who should commit any felony, misde-
meanour, or other offence indictable or punishable by laws of this realm’; and
‘have full power and authority to purchase and hold lands, tenements and
hereditaments to them’.11
The defendants’ response to the plaintiffs’ claims was a rather narrow one.
It was contended that it was the corporation that was injured and that as the
corporation was not party to the claim, the court did not have the proper
plaintiff appearing before the court. The correct procedure, so it was argued,
was to use the name of the corporation and, in that case,
‘it would have been open for the Defendants, or the body of directors or
proprietors assuming the government of the company, to have applied to the
Court for the stay of proceedings, or to prevent the use of the corporate name;
and, upon that application, the Court would have inquired into the alleged
usurpation or abuse of authority, and determined whether the Plaintiff should
be permitted to proceed’.12
In short, there was a serious procedural obstacle preventing the case being
heard by the court. As mentioned above, the court held in favour of the
defendants, but it is important to look at the court’s reasoning. The
Vice-Chancellor (Sir James Wigram) explained the underlying procedural
dilemma very clearly:
‘The Victoria Park Company is an incorporated body, and the conduct with
which the Defendants are charged in this suit is an injury not to the Plaintiffs
exclusively ; it is an injury to the whole corporation by individuals whom the
corporation entrusted with powers to be exercised only for the good of the
corporation.’13
10 Ibid at 191.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid at 200.
13 Ibid at 202.
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Referring to the case The Attorney-General v Wilson,14 The Vice-
Chancellor then confirmed the principle that the proper plaintiff to bring the
suit against alleged wrongdoings by the directors of the corporation is the
corporation. He then explained what the procedural problem for Foss and
the other plaintiffs was:
‘[I]nstead of the corporation being formally represented as Plaintiffs, the bill in
this case is brought by two individual corporators, professedly on behalf of
themselves and all other members of the corporation, except those who
committed the injuries complained of — the Plaintiffs assuming to themselves
the right and power in that manner to sue on behalf of and represent the
corporation itself.’15
Thus, under the guise of the proper plaintiff rule, the court refused to
judge the merits of the case. The Vice-Chancellor rejected the defendants’
argument that it was totally impossible for individuals to institute an action
on behalf of the company. It was pointed out that there might be instances
where ‘difficulties arising out of technical rules respecting the mode in which
corporations are required to sue’will have to bow to the principles of justice
and equity.16 It was simply a matter of considering whether the case at hand
was one where, in the interests of justice, an exception should be allowed,
based on justice and equity, to allow the plaintiffs to sue although the
company was the proper plaintiff.. The Vice-Chancellor referred to the
allegation of the plaintiffs that the directors were in breach of their fiduciary
duties towards the company by having approved that the company buy their
own personal properties from them at a profit to allow the corporation to
develop these properties. The general principle here is that such transactions
are voidable to the option of the corporation. However, there is a very
important qualification, namely that the corporation may decide to hold the
directors to the contracts so concluded. This will be the case if the company,
by convening a general meeting, would decide so by way of a majority vote
by the general meeting. In this case, it was pointed out that no such a meeting
at which this issue could have been decided had ever been convened. Thus, it
was pointed out that even if an order is made that the directors were in
breach of their fiduciary duties, such an order would be without any practical
effect if the general meeting were to decide to hold the directors to the
contract and continue with the development of the property on behalf of the
company.
In short, the way in which the bill was framed was totally flawed as there
was no indication that an attempt was made to convene such a general
meeting to consider whether or not the contracts with the directors should
be avoided, or whether the corporation would effectively ratify or condone
the breach of the directors’ duties and continue developing the property
obtained from the directors. There was also no indication in the bill that it
14 Cr & Ph 1.
15 Foss v Harbottle supra note 7 at 202.
16 Ibid at 203.
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was impossible to convene a general meeting, or that the plaintiffs had
resorted to all means and found it ineffectual to convene a general meeting
for the very purpose of confirming or cancelling the property contracts the
corporations had concluded with the directors.As it was explained:
‘[T]here is no suggestion [in the bill] that an attempt has been made by any
proprietor to set the body of proprietors in motion, or to procure a meeting to
be convened for the purpose of revoking the acts complained of.’17
Nowhere in Foss v Harbottle is it clearly stated that courts are reluctant to
interfere in the internal affairs of a company; nowhere is it stated that a court
will not second-guess directors’ decisions, or that directors’ business judg-
ments would not be challenged by courts of law. There is not even any direct
reference to the importance of the application of the principle of majority
rule in company law. Also, the Vice-Chancellor seems not to be concerned
with opening the floodgates of litigation if courts are prepared to consider
internal company matters. So, what does Foss v Harbottle stand for?
It has correctly been referred to as establishing the proper-plaintiff rule in
the sense that, in principle, it is the company who should sue for any wrong
committed against, and affecting, the company as a separate legal entity. It is
also safe to conclude that the court did not want to make an order that would
have no practical effect in the sense of a company being able to convene a
general meeting after the court order has been made and confirming a
transaction in breach of directors’ duties. Thirdly, it most certainly stands for
the proposition that a court will only be prepared to interfere with internal
company matters if plaintiffs have first exhausted all their internal remedies,
and if it is clear to the court that an unjustifiable wrong has been committed.
It is, therefore, indisputable that the rule in Foss v Harbottle provided a
formidable obstacle for minority shareholders to get their concerns regarding
internal wrongdoings heard by the courts. Thus Foss v Harbottle established a
strong precedent for non-interference in internal company matters, as will
become clearer later.
A second prominent older English case,Mozley v Alston,18 is often quoted
in conjunction with Foss v Harbottle. In this case two shareholders sought an
injunction against twelve directors, restraining them from acting as directors
of the Birmingham and Oxford Junction Railway Company. It was argued
that because these twelve directors did not re-elect four directors as
prescribed by legislation, the whole body was constituted illegally and that in
actual fact only six directors, later elected, should have the powers to act as
directors. The Lord Chancellor (Cottenham) made the point that there are
cases where a court will allow individuals to bring a case on behalf of others
involved in bodies with a large number of persons, but then the interests of all
those who are represented should be identical — in this case it was not clear
at all whether that was the case. However, the actual reason for demurring
17 Ibid at 204.
18 Supra note 8.
THE JUDGE-MADE RULE OF NON-INTERFERENCE 309
JOBNAME: SALJ10 Part2 PAGE: 7 SESS: 4 OUTPUT: Wed May 26 07:47:37 2010
/dtp22/juta/juta/SALJ−2010−Part2/03article
the bill was based on a specific part of the reasoning in Foss v Harbottle,
namely, that ‘there existed in the company the means of rectifying what was
complained of, by a suit in the name of the company’.19
It was argued that the same considerations would apply in this case (Mozley
v Alston), as it was alleged in the bill that ‘a large majority of the shareholders
are of the same opinion’ as the plaintiffs. Thus, the court basically encouraged
the shareholders to convene a general meeting and then approach the court
on behalf of the corporation to restrain the twelve directors to act as directors
of the Birmingham and Oxford Junction Railway Company.
It is submitted that the most prominent proposition that could be
extracted fromMozley v Alston is that the company is the proper plaintiff for
wrongs committed against the company as a separate legal entity. Although
less prominently, it also stands for the proposition that a court will not be
prepared to interfere with internal company matters until the plaintiffs have
first exhausted all their internal remedies. It is not certain at all that, as in Foss
v Harbottle, the court had in its contemplation the fact that it would not make
the order sought because such an order would have no practical effect if the
company would convene a meeting and ratify the wrong of which the
plaintiffs had complained.
Before we move chronologically to the next cases, it is worthwhile to
point out that in 1867, in the case of Hoole v Great Western Railroad Co,20 it
was held that a court will not hesitate to interfere with a decision taken, even
on application of one shareholder only, by any company organ (board of
directors or general meeting of shareholders) if the decision taken by that
company organ was ultra vires or ‘altogether beyond [that organ’s] power’.21
It is, however, the cases that dealt with less extreme instances where it
becomes less clear what the real reasons were why the courts were prepared to
interfere with internal company matters or were prepared to second-guess the
decisions of company organs. Or, to put it in the negative, why the courts
were reluctant to interfere with the internal affairs of a company or why the
courts were reluctant to second-guess the decisions of company organs.
(iii) Cases decided between 1848 and 1889
Lord v The Governor and Company of Copper Miners22 is one of the first
cases (1848) where Foss v Harbottle was quoted as having established the rule
that courts will not interfere with the internal affairs of a company. It will be
recalled from the discussion above that that particular paraphrasing did not
appear in Foss v Harbottle. In Lord’s case, the majority shareholders, consisting
primarily of the board members or governing body as it was called, approved
of certain transactions, including a plan to vest all the property of the
company in trustees for the purpose of liquidating the company’s affairs. The
19 Ibid at 837.
20 (1867) 3 ChApp 262.
21 Ibid at 268 (Lord Cairns LJ) and 274–5 (Sir JohnRolt LJ).
22 (1848) 41 ER 1129 at 1134.
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plaintiff then brought an action, on behalf of himself and all the other
shareholders, apart from the members of the governing body, to challenge
the validity of the transactions approved by the general meeting. The court,
in holding that the sanctioning of the transactions by the general meeting
could not be challenged, relied on the rule against interference with internal
company affairs. The headnote to the case traced the origins of the rule back
to two prominent cases and summarises the ratio of the court’s decision: ‘The
doctrine of Foss v Harbottle (2 Hare, 492) andMozley v Alston (1 Phill, 700), as
to the interference of this Court in the internal administration of incorpo-
rated companies, confirmed’.23
The Lord Chancellor (Cottenham) was very clear in explaining the
difficulties that faced the court. It had become more frequent for litigants to
challenge transactions of joint stock companies through litigation. On the
one hand there was the duty the court had to provide remedies for litigants
who were affected by the conduct of joint stock companies; on the other
hand, the Lord Chancellor observed that he was ‘not insensible to the danger
of carrying this principle too far’ as that could lead to the courts being
inundated with litigation, ‘which this Court may not have the means of so
exercising’. The Lord Chancellor admitted that there was ‘great difficulty in
drawing the line’ between the two competing considerations he mentioned
and also admitted that ‘[c]ases of this kind are . . . attended with great
difficulty’.24
It is worth quoting from the judgment as it reveals a lot about the practical
reasons why the court was so reluctant to consider the merits of internal
managerial decisions taken by company organs:
‘I find all the complaints made by the individual shareholders to consist of acts
within the powers of the corporation, and all sanctioned by general meetings of
shareholders and no allegation raising any case for the interference of a Court of
Equity with the exercise of such rights. A Court of Equity could not assume
jurisdiction in such a case, without opening its doors to all parties interested in
corporations, or joint stock companies, or private partnerships, who, although a
small minority of the body to which they belong, may wish to interfere in the
conduct of the majority. This cannot be done, and the attempt to introduce
such a remedy ought to be checked for the benefit of the community.’25
The Lord Chancellor then expressed his ‘strong approbation’ of the rule
laid down by Sir JamesWigram in Foss v Harbottle. It is not at all clear whether
it was in actual fact the strong support for the proper-purpose rule, the
support of the application of majority rule in companies, or whether it was
the daunting consequences of even slightly opening the door in this regard
for minority shareholders that moved The Lord Chancellor to support the
rule in Foss v Harbottle so strongly. In my view it was the last-mentioned
reason.
23 Ibid at 1129.
24 Ibid at 1133.
25 Ibid at 1134.
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The importance of the joint stock company as a separate legal entity was
already well-appreciated when cases like Foss v Harbottle,Mozley v Alston and
Lord v The Governor and Company of Copper Miners were decided. It had
become clear that separate legal entities could only act through the medium
of human beings, and that such human beings assemble as company organs to
take decisions on behalf of these entities.26 These organs take decisions based
on the fundamental principle of majority rule. That simply means it is either
the board of directors that takes decisions on behalf of the company, or the
general meeting of shareholders. Any individual shareholder who was not
satisfied with the way a company was governed internally should first exhaust
all his or her internal remedies. One very important such internal remedy was
to convene a general meeting and to put the matter complained about to the
vote. At this forum the will of the majority must prevail, so it was held by
several very prominent older English cases.
Thus, it is the company as separate entity that is in actual fact the proper
plaintiff to address all wrongs committed against the company, and it is the
company as separate legal entity and only the company as separate entity
(almost at all costs!) that should be allowed standing in such cases. The
minority has no such standing, unless the wrong complained about falls
within the exceptions to the rule in Foss v Harbottle. Then, the minority
shareholders will either have standing to bring a derivative action — an
action derived from what the company would have had if it was not for the
fact that the majority who committed the wrong was in control — or a
personal action when a shareholder’s personal rights were affected by the
conduct of any company organ.Approaches differ, but it is generally said that
a wrong committed by the majority (a company organ) cannot be ratified if it
constituted, for instance: a ‘fraud on the minority’; was an ultra vires act in
breach of the rights of the company as set out in the constitution; or was
unlawful conduct and conduct in breach of the common law of the type
which is not ratifiable by an ordinary resolution, and which amounts to a
wrong to the company.27
Another classic case quoted for the proposition that the court will not
interfere with a company’s internal affairs is the 1875 case of MacDougall v
26 As long ago as 1860, these principles were explained with great clarity by
Nathanial Lindley (N Lindley Treatise on the Law of Partnership, including its Application
to Joint-Stock and other Companies: Volume I (1860) 465): ‘One of the great peculiarities,
as distinguished from partnerships, is that the management of a company’s business is
entrusted to a few chosen individuals, and that the shareholders are deprived of that
right of personal interference which is enjoyed by the members of ordinary firms.
The members of companies form two bodies, whose interests are or should be the
same, but whose powers and functions are different; the one body consists of the
directors, in whom the general powers of management are vested, and the other body
consists of the great bulk of shareholders, to whom the directors are accountable, and
by whom they are generally appointed. Each of the bodies has its own sphere of
action, and its own rights and duties. . . .’
27 See H S Cilliers, M L Benade, J J Henning, J J du Plessis, P A Delport, L De
Koker and J TPretoriusCilliers & Benade: Corporate Law 3 ed (2000) 286ff.
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Gardiner.28 Similar to Lindley LJ, James LJ in MacDougall’s case used the
proper plaintiff rule as the reason why a court will not hear internal disputes
between shareholders brought by the minority shareholders only, ‘unless
there be something illegal, oppressive, or fraudulent — unless there is
something ultra vires on the part the company quà company, or on the part of
the majority of the company . . .’.29 James LJ was very clear about what type
of conduct would be considered to be typically internal matters:
‘The truth is, that is only part of the machinery and means by which the internal
management is carried on. The whole question comes back to a question of
internal management: that is to say, whether the meeting ought or ought not to
be held in a particular way, whether the directors ought or ought not to have
sanctioned certain proceedings which they are about to sanction, whether one
director ought or ought not to be removed, and whether another director
ought or ought not to have been appointed.’30
Earlier on the same page, James LJ illustrated the dire consequences if the
courts were to entertain in these types of internal managerial matters — not
only would an individual shareholder then be able to make the court order a
general meeting to be held, but also to make an order that the other
‘shareholders must stay there to listen to him and be convinced by him’.31
Another reason for the reluctance to rule on matters of internal company
management was that it may lead to a court expressing ‘an opinion on
something which may lead to no practical result’.32 It was exactly this
dilemma that faced Sargant J in British Murac Syndicate Ltd v Alperton Rubber
Co Ltd.33 Having held that the company was precluded from amending its
articles in breach of a separate contract that conferred the right on another
company to appoint two directors to the board of the defendant company, it
was suggested by the defendant company that it would simply remove the
directors under another article. Sargant J then had to rely on the moral
argument that ‘having regard to the respect which is ordinarily shown to the
decision of a court of justice, the company would hopefully not proceed with
such removal’ (emphasis supplied). In a rather unconvincing way, he also
pointed out that the purpose of the provision on the removal of directors
could never have been intended to achieve such a result,34 nor in other
words, to make a value judgement as to the actual purpose of a rule of
internal company management! In sharp contrast stands the case of Bainbridge
v Smith.35 Here the court granted an injunction or restraining order, but then
dissolved such order after the company took a resolution at a general meeting
that they did not want a particular person to act as managing director any
28 (1875) 1 ChD 13 (CA).
29 Ibid at 21–2.
30 Ibid at 23.
31 Ibid at 23.
32 Ibid at 24.
33 [1915] 2 Ch 186.
34 Ibid at 197.
35 (1889) 41 ChD 462.
THE JUDGE-MADE RULE OF NON-INTERFERENCE 313
JOBNAME: SALJ10 Part2 PAGE: 11 SESS: 4 OUTPUT: Wed May 26 07:47:37 2010
/dtp22/juta/juta/SALJ−2010−Part2/03article
longer, irrespective of whether or not he held the required number of shares
in his own right.36
To get back toMacDougall v Gardiner,37 Mellish LJ in that case was clearly
more concerned about the practical consequences of opening the door for
frivolous or vexatious claims by individual shareholders if courts were
prepared to rule on internal managerial matters:
‘Now, if that gives a right to every member of the company to file a bill to have
the question decided, then if there happens to be one cantankerous member, or
one member who loves litigation, everything of this kind will be litigated;
whereas, if the bill must be filed in the name of the company, then, unless there
is a majority who really wish for litigation, the litigation will not go ahead.
Therefore, holding that such suits must be brought in the name of the company
does certainly greatly tend to stop litigation.’38
In short, Mellish LJ also used the rule in Foss v Harbottle, and the practical
consequences that would result if that rule were not followed, as a basis for
the reasoning why courts should be reluctant to interfere with the internal
affairs of companies — the courts were reluctant to hear the cases of minority
shareholders, as that would open the floodgates of litigation.
In 1883, in the case of Isle of Wight Railway Company v Tahourdin,39 the
court had to decide whether directors could ignore the request of sharehold-
ers to convene a general meeting at which the intention was to appoint a
committee and for that committee, inter alia, to consider the removal of
directors. The directors ignored this request, but convened a meeting only to
consider the appointment of ‘a committee to inquire into the working and
general management of the company and the means of reducing the working
expenses’. Realising that they would not be able to remove the directors at
such a meeting, the shareholders convened a meeting themselves with all the
stated objects for that meeting. The directors then brought an action in the
name of the company to restrain the shareholders from holding that meeting.
It is unnecessary to go into detail about why the Court of Appeal agreed
that the restraining order should fail. It is, however, important to focus on
what the court had to say about the powers of directors, and when a court
would be prepared to consider whether an organ like the general meeting
would have powers to override the discretionary powers of directors. There
were three separate judgments, all agreeing that the restraining order should
not be granted, but with different approaches regarding the powers of the
board and the shareholders. Fry LJ did not deal with any specific legal
principle in this regard. However, Cotton LJ and Lindley LJ both made
prominent statements, although different reasons were given for non-
36 Ibid at p 475: see the reference to an extraordinary shareholders’ meeting held
on 15April 1889 at the end of the judgment. See alsoCooper v Garratt 1945WLD 137
at 151–2.
37 Supra note 28.
38 Ibid at 25.
39 (1883) 25 ChD 320 (CA).
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interference with internal decisions by company organs. Cotton LJ focused
on the powers of directors and when shareholders would be able to give
additional instructions to them:
‘Directors have great powers, and the Court refuses to interfere with their
management of the company’s affairs if they keep within their powers, and if a
shareholder complains of the conduct of directors while they keep within their
powers, the Court says to him: ‘‘If you want to alter the management of the
affairs of the company go to a general meeting, and if they agree with you they
will pass a resolution obliging the directors to alter their course of proceed-
ings.’’ ’40
Lindley LJ, on the other hand, approached the matter from the point of
view of standing and the rule in Foss v Harbottle:
‘We must bear in mind the decision in Foss v Harbottle 2 Hare, 461 and the line
of cases following it, on which the Court has constantly and consistently refused
to interfere on behalf of shareholders, until they have done the best they can to
set aside the matters which they complain, by calling a general meeting.’41
It seems that Cotton LJ’s argument and Lindley LJ’s argument are based on
two different considerations. Cotton LJ recognised the wide managerial
powers of directors and the courts’ reluctance to interfere with managerial
decisions of directors, but with the important qualification — only if ‘they
keep within their powers’ — repeated twice in the same sentence. Lindley
LJ, on the other hand, seems to be of the opinion that a court will only
interfere on behalf of shareholders (clearly minority shareholders) if they
have exhausted all their internal remedies by leaving the ultimate decision to
a vote by the general meeting. We all know that such an approach made
minority shareholders enter into a roundabout, with the ultimate route out
of the roundabout being to rely on the highly complex and often irreconcil-
able exceptions to the rule in Foss v Harbottle. Remarkably, it seems as if
Cotton LJ’s observations added a new dimension to the rule of non-
interference in internal company matters. His observations now shifted the
debate to the powers of the directors as a company organ. This, as will be seen
later, became a very prominent focus which led eventually to the proper
purpose doctrine.
It is very interesting that Len Sealy, many years later, reflected on the
tensions created by several of the rules and doctrines of internal governance
developed by the courts. He defended the fact that courts should not waste
their time on reviewing matters of internal procedure or ‘to listen to people
who want to re-open questions of company strategy and business judg-
ment’.42 He also points out that ‘the last thing business litigants want is to
have a court review a transaction or a decision and impose with the
advantage of hindsight some discretionary solution in the name of ‘‘fair-
40 Ibid at 330–1.
41 Ibid at 333.
42 L S SealyCompany Law and Commercial Reality (1984) 53.
THE JUDGE-MADE RULE OF NON-INTERFERENCE 315
JOBNAME: SALJ10 Part2 PAGE: 13 SESS: 4 OUTPUT: Wed May 26 07:47:37 2010
/dtp22/juta/juta/SALJ−2010−Part2/03article
ness’’ ’.43 However, he points out that because of ‘a distaste’ or even ‘fear’ of
judges not to interfere with internal company affairs, they kept on finding
justifications for also not assisting minority shareholders with legitimate
claims.44 There are clearly some serious tensions here.
(iv) Cases decided in the 1900s
The case of John Shaw & Sons (Salford) Ltd v Shaw,45 decided in 1935, did not
deal directly with the reluctance of courts to interfere with the internal affairs
of a company, but the principle established in the case provides a good
example of when a court will be prepared to rule on an internal company
matter. In this case the articles of association were amended to give wide
powers to three permanent directors. These permanent directors convened a
meeting and, at that meeting, a resolution was passed that the company’s
solicitors should institute action against some of the ordinary directors, who
were also shareholders of the company. These shareholders then convened a
general meeting at which a resolution was passed to instruct the chairman of
the general meeting to instruct the solicitors to discontinue the action against
the ordinary directors and shareholders. Thus, the question for the court was
to decide whether the general meeting had the power to overrule the
decision taken by the majority of the permanent directors. Greer LJ pointed
out that it was a case of determining whether the majority of the permanent
directors had the power to pass the resolution at a board meeting. He held
that they indeed had such powers in terms of the company’s articles of
association as amended. Under these circumstances, the general meeting
could not usurp the powers of the board. Greer LJ then made the following
oft-quoted statement:
‘A company is an entity distinct alike from its shareholders and its directors.
Some of its powers may, according to its articles of association, be exercised by
the directors, certain other powers may be reserved for the shareholders in
general meeting. If powers of management are vested in the directors, they and
they alone can exercise these powers. The only way in which the general body
of shareholders can control the exercise of the powers vested by the articles in
the directors is by altering their articles, or if opportunity arises under the
articles, by refusing to re-elect the directors of whose actions they disapprove.
[The general body of shareholders] cannot themselves usurp the powers which,
by the articles, are vested in the directors any more than the directors can usurp
the powers vested by the articles in the general body of shareholders.’46
The principle that functions conferred on an organ in terms of the articles
should be exercised by that organ only has been confirmed in Scott v Scott.47
In that case, a resolution of the general meeting that a weekly amount be paid
to preference shareholders up to the date when the annual dividend was
43 Ibid at 47.
44 Ibid at 53–4.
45 [1935] 2 KB 113.
46 Ibid at 134.
47 [1943] 1All ER 582 (Ch).
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declared, and that those interim payments then be debited against the
ultimate dividend, was found to be invalid. The reason for declaring the
resolution invalid was that the general meeting of members by its resolution
sought to do something which in terms of the articles fell within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the board of directors.48
The principle enunciated in Scott v Scott and John Shaw & Sons (Salford) Ltd
v Shaw has led to what has later been called ‘the doctrine of the supremacy of
the articles of association’. In the SouthAfrican case of LSA (UK) Ltd v Impala
Platinum Holdings (Ltd),49 Schutz JA explained the principle of supremacy of
the articles of association as follows:
‘What it amounts to is that the founding members, and also a later body of
members by special resolution, may order the internal affairs of their company
in the way that suits them best, subject to such prohibitions as may exist in the
Act or any other law, statutory or common. This dispensation is unsurprising
when one statute governs many diverse forms of company.’50
In short, it seems a well-established rule and a sound consideration for a
court not to interfere with duly exercised powers conferred upon company
organs by the articles of association. In other words, now it was clear that the
focus shifted more and more towards what the particular powers of company
organs were. This in turn motivated the courts not only to consider what the
purposes of certain internal powers conferred on company organs were, but
also to consider whether these powers were exercised for a proper or
permissible purpose.
The 1923 Australian case of The Australian Metropolitan Life Assurance Co
Ltd v Ure51 is a particularly interesting one for at least two reasons. First, it
provides good authority that a court will respect the powers given to
directors in terms of the articles of association. Secondly, the court will not
readily interfere with an internal managerial decision taken by the directors
based on a power conferred upon the directors by the articles of association.
The power that directors had in terms of article 21 of the company’s articles
of association was the power that ‘directors may refuse to register any transfer
whatsoever of any shares without assigning any reason therefore’. The
directors refused to register the transfer of Mr Ure’s shares. Their underlying
reason, which was not disclosed to Ure, was simply that a majority of the
board did not want Mr Ure to become a director of the company. This
decision was challenged, but the court refused to interfere with the directors’
decision. The reason why the court refused to interfere was because it was
concluded that the power of refusal to register Mr Ure’s shares was exercised
bona fide for a proper purpose:
48 Cilliers et al op cit note 27 at p 87 para 7.08.
49 (222/98) [2000] ZASCA178 (28March 2000).
50 See further J J du Plessis ‘Beskikkingsvryheid oor interne bestuursorganisasie,
interne bevoegdheidsverdeling en die prominensie van die statute in die maatskappy-
ereg’1992TSAR 94 at 99, referred to by Schutz JA in his judgment.
51 (1923) 33 CLR 199.
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‘[A]lthough it is a power [power to refuse registration of shares] which
necessarily involves some discretion, it must be exercised, as all such powers
must be, bona fide— that is, for the purpose for which it was conferred, not arbitrarily
or at the absolute will of the directors, but honestly in the interest of the
shareholders as a whole.’52
The court recognised that the circumstances of each particular case may
vary, but spent considerable time in explaining what type of factors a court
will consider in determining whether a particular power was exercised bona
fide for the purpose for which it was conferred.53
In 1974 it was pointed out that that a court cannot, in actual fact, interfere
with internal decisions arrived at bona fide and honestly, as LordWilberforce
explained inHoward Smith Ltd v Ampol Petroleum Ltd:
‘Their Lordships accept that such a matter as the raising of finance is one of
management, within the responsibility of the directors: they accept that it
would be wrong for the court to substitute its opinion for that of management,
or indeed to question the correctness of management’s decision, on such a
question, if bona fide arrived at. There is no appeal on merits frommanagement
decisions to courts of law: nor will courts of law assume to act as a kind of
supervisory board over decisions within the powers of management honestly
arrived at.’54
The reason why a court will not interfere with duly exercised internal
decisions of directors has been explained differently in other cases. In
Shuttleworth v Cox Brothers and Company (Maidenhead) Limited it was said that
‘[i]t was not the business of the court to manage the affairs of the company’.55
InDarvall v North Sydney Brick56 Kirby P (in 1989) explained as follows:
‘Courts properly refrain from assuming the management of corporations and
substituting their decisions and assessments for those of directors. They do so,
inter alia, because directors can be expected to have much greater knowledge
52 The Australian Metropolitan Life Assurance Co Ltd v Ure (1923) 33 CLR 199 at 217
(emphasis in original case). Several of the leading English cases are cited as authority
for this proposition, including:Allen v Gold Reefs of West Africa Ltd [1900] 1 Ch 656 at
671; Automatic Self-cleansing Filter Syndicate Co v Cunninghame [1906] 2 Ch 34 at 45;
British Equitable Co v Baily [1906]AC 35 at 42. Cf Nicolette Rogers ‘When can target
directors legitimately frustrate a takeover bid?’ (1994) 12 C&S LJ 207 at 210–1. See
also In re a Company (no 00370 of 1987), Ex parte Glossop [1988] 1WLR 1068 (Ch) at
1076H–1077A.
53 TheAustralianMetropolitan Life Assurance Co Ltd v Ure supra note 52 at 217–20.
54 Howard Smith Ltd v Ampol Petroleum Ltd [1974]AC 821 (CA) at 832E–F. See also
Wayde v NSW Rugby League Ltd (1985) 10 ACLR 87 (HC of A) at 93–4; Harlow’s
Nominees Pty Ltd vWoodside (Lakes Entrance) Oil CoNL (1968) 121CLR 483 at 493.
55 Shuttleworth v Cox Brothers and Company (Maidenhead) Limited [1927] 2 KB 9 at
23–4.
56 (1989) 15 ACLR 230 at 247. See also Harlow’s Nominees Pty Ltd v Woodside
(Lakes Entrance) Oil Co NL supra note 54 at 493: ‘Directors in whom are vested the
right and duty of deciding where the company’s interests lie and how they are to be
served may be concerned with a wide range of practical considerations, and their
judgment, if exercised in good faith and not for irrelevant purposes, is not open to
review in the courts.’
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and more time and expertise at their disposal to evaluate the best interests of the
corporation than judges.’
Several South African cases are quoted in Makhuva v Lukoto Bus Service
(Pty) Ltd57 to confirm that the principle of non-interference in internal
company affairs is well-embedded in the South African law (although it is
only a case of the former Venda Supreme Court, and primarily dealing with
the concept of winding-up of a company based on the ground ‘just and
equitable’). The specific circumstances in which a South African court will
be prepared to interfere are, however, far from clear. It is therefore submitted
that the principles developed in Australia and in English cases will also be
good authority in SouthAfrica.
(v) Extracting the reasons for the non-interference rules from the cases discussed
At this stage, it is important to extract, from the cases discussed, the possible
reasons why the courts were reluctant to interfere in the internal governance
matters of companies.Already in 1812 it was established inCarlen v Drury that
a court will not take over the role of managing the business of companies, and
that dissatisfied members should first rely on the company’s own internal
mechanisms to resolve their differences before approaching the court. These
rules were applied in several later cases. Also, at a very early stage, it was
realised that if courts are prepared to interfere too readily with internal
company matters, they would be inundated by cases, which would make it
impossible for them to handle the sheer volume of litigation — the fear of
opening the floodgates of litigation. Although never stated so explicitly, the
rule in Foss v Harbottle establishing the proper plaintiff rule, provided one of
the most convenient excuses for later courts not even to consider the merits
of internal company disputes. Thus, in actual fact, Foss v Harbottle established
a strong precedent for non-interference in internal company matters.
Another reason why the courts were reluctant to decide on internal
matters was the realisation that it could lead to the court having to make
orders with no practical results. For instance, if a court order could
subsequently be circumvented by rectifying the wrong following proper
internal procedures— for instance, by convening a meeting to ratify a breach
of duty or altering a company’s articles of association to validate the wrong
complained about — understandably, the courts would see its order as an
exercise in futility.
Finally, it was argued that judges will not second-guess directors’ decisions, as
the directors have much greater knowledge and more time and expertise at
their disposal than judges to make business judgments and consider the best
interests of the company.
It is however important to note that the courts were prepared to point to
circumstances where they would be prepared to consider the merits of
internal company disputes and be prepared to interfere.
57 1987 (3) SA376 (V).
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Again, as early as 1812, it was established inCarlen v Drury that a court will
interfere if a company’s ‘internal rules’ were not effectual.58 Additionally, the
court inCarlen v Drury held that it will interfere ‘promptly and immediately’,
but only if a ‘case of Breach of Engagement, or Abuse of Trust’ is established
‘to the perfect Satisfaction of the Court’ and it was required that ‘a Case of
Delinquency [of the managers] should be clearly made out . . . [and] there
must be a positive Necessity for the Interference of the Court, arising from
the Refusal or Neglect of the [Management] Committee to act’.59 Also,
several highly complex and often unjustifiable exceptions to the rule in Foss v
Harbottle developed over time: ‘fraud on the minority’; ultra vires acts in
breach of the rights of the company as set out in the constitution; or unlawful
conduct and conduct in breach of the common law of the type which is not
ratifiable by an ordinary resolution, and which amounts to a wrong to the
company.
It is interesting to note that by 1883, in the case of Isle of Wight Railway
Company v Tahourdin, Cotton LJ’s observations added a new dimension to the
rule of non-interference in internal company matters. His observations
shifted the focus of the issue of interference or non-interference in internal
company matters towards the powers of the directors as a company organ.
This, as will be seen in the next part, became a very prominent focus leading
eventually to the proper purpose doctrine. These developments were,
however, slow, and took place over more than 100 years.
III QUALIFICATIONS REQUIRED OF RULE AGAINST INTER-
FERENCE WITH INTERNAL COMPANY MATTERS
(a) Overview
In the same year that Isle of Wight Railway Company v Tahourdin was decided,
it was more prominently stated that more than one test is required when the
conduct of internal company organs is challenged. This occurred in the case
ofHutton vWest Cork Railway Co,60 where Bowen LJ, dealing with a decision
taken by the general meeting, pointed out as follows:
‘[The shareholders in general meeting] can only spend money which is not
theirs but the company’s, if they are spending it for the purpose which are
58 It should be remembered that articles of association and internal governance
arrangements were in a primitive stage of development in 1812. It is in actual fact only
roughly from 1844, with the passing of the Joint Stock CompaniesAct of 1844 (7 & 8
Vict c 110) and, more particularly, the Joint Stock Companies Act of 1856 (19 & 20
Vic c 47) that internal company law arrangements started to be refined by way of
model sets of articles of association. See generally Jean J du Plessis ‘Corporate law and
corporate governance lessons from the past: Ebbs and flows, but far from ‘‘The end of
history . . .’’ part 1’ (2009) 30 The Company Lawyer 43 at 49 et seq and ‘Corporate law
and corporate governance lessons from the past: Ebbs and flows, but far from ‘‘The
end of history . . .’’part 2’ (2009) 30The Company Lawyer 71 at 73.
59 Carlen v Drury supra note 2 at 63.
60 (1883) 23 ChD 654.
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reasonably incidental to the carrying on of the business of the company. That is
a general doctrine. Bona fides cannot be the sole test, otherwise you might have
a lunatic conducting the affairs of the company, and paying away its money
with both hands in a manner perfectly bonâ fide yet perfectly irrational. The test
must be what is reasonably incidental to, and within the reasonable scope of
carrying on, the business of the company.’61
As far as exercising powers conferred upon directors is concerned, it has
been established over time that they must exercise those powers in good faith
(bona fide), honestly and ‘in the best interests of the company as a whole’.62
However, it was also realised that qualifications were required of each and
every one of these requirements. These qualifications started to emerge
because it seemed somewhat preposterous only to set directors’ decisions
aside if the directors did not act with good faith — that is, only when they
acted in bad faith (mala fide) — or when the directors did not act honestly —
that is, only when they acted dishonestly. Furthermore, in cases not involving
a conflict of interest (self-interest), it was never really difficult for directors to
find one or other reason why they had in actual fact acted in the best interests
of the company as a whole. Because of the realisation that there should be
some middle-ground between the two extremes of, on the one hand,
virtually no possibility for the courts to interfere with internal matters of
companies and, on the other hand, an unnecessarily wide discretion for
courts to interfere with internal company affairs, a few developments took
place over time.
(b) The ‘bona fide in the best interests of the company as a whole’ and the ‘proper
purpose’ doctrines differentiated
Gradually it became clear that apart from the requirements of ‘good faith
(bona fides)’; ‘honesty’; and ‘best interests of the company as a whole’, it
should also be asked whether the directors acted ‘for a proper purpose’
(leading to what is nowadays described as the proper-purpose doctrine).63 So,
it started to emerge that in cases where the courts had to consider whether a
particular power had been exercised for its proper purpose, the court would
not simply hear the directors say that in exercising the particular power they
had acted in the best interests of the company as a whole. The courts have
61 Ibid at 671.
62 As to the meaning of the phrase ‘best interests of the company as a whole’ see J T
Pretorius, P A Delport, Michelle Havenga & Maria Vermaas Hahlo’s South African
Company Law through the Cases — A Source Book 6 ed (1999) at 293, but as Ross W
Parsons ‘The director’s duty of good faith’ (1967) 5 Melbourne University LR 395 at
396 points out ‘the concept remains miserably indeterminate’. It is submitted that it is
still the case: see Kirwan v Cresvale Far East Ltd (In Liq) (2002) 44 ACSR 21 (CA,
NSW) para 127 (per Giles JA). I would respectfully agree with Young CJ’s observa-
tion in Kirwan’s case that ‘[i]t is of no real use to regurgitate the numerous utterances
of past courts on this topic’ (para 292). See also Ex parte Glossop [1988] 1 WLR 1068
(Ch) at 1076G; L S Sealy ‘ ‘‘Bona fides’’ and ‘‘proper purposes’’ in corporate decisions’
(1989) 15Monash University LR 265 at 269–71.
63 See generally J J du Plessis op cit note 1.
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invariably rejected such defences in cases where the self-interest of directors
was involved.64 In cases of this type, the fact that directors had acted in the
best interests of the company as a whole has been held to serve no other
purpose than restating the general law.65 It has also been held that there are
definite instances where the test, ‘the benefit of the company as a whole’, is in
actual fact ‘largely meaningless’.66 Another reason why the courts were
simply not prepared to accept directors’ defences that they have acted in the
best interests of the company as a whole was that in cases where a misuse of
powers is alleged, the crucial issue is often not ‘the interests of the company’,
but the interests of shareholders and what is fair between different classes of
shareholders.67 For all these reasons it had been argued forcefully that
directors’duty ‘to act bona fide and in the best interests of the company’ should
be treated as conceptually independent of the duty ‘to act for proper
purposes’.68
This distinction is now also clearly recognised in modern legislation.
64 Howard Smith Ltd v Ampol Petroleum Ltd [1974] AC 821 (CA) at 834G; Hogg v
Cramphorn Ltd [1967] Ch 254 at 267Aff; Whitehouse v Carlton Hotel Pty Ltd (1987) 5
ACLR 715 (HC ofA) at 718; Southern Resources Ltd v Residues Treatment & Training Co
Ltd (1990) 8 ACLC 1151 ((SC (SA)) at 1164; Lee Panavision Ltd v Lee Lighting Ltd
[1992] BCLC 22 (CA) at 29d–30h. See also B Galgut (consulting editor) and J A
Kunst, P Delport and Q Vorster (eds) Henochsberg on the Companies Act: Volume 2
(Service Issue 27) 5 ed (2008) 467–8; Tony Steel ‘Defensive tactics in corporate
takeovers’ (1986) 4 Company and Securities LJ 30 at 31. It is submitted that M S
Blackman ‘Companies’ inWA Joubert (founding ed) The Law of South Africa vol 4(2)
(1996) at 7 states the principle too widely when he argues that directors will ‘still be
guilty of acting for an improper purpose’ (emphasis supplied).At least a ‘self-interest’ is
required and where there is no such self-interest the improper or impermissible
purposemust be primary or substantial— see the discussion below.
65 Howard Smith Ltd v Ampol Petroleum Ltd supra note 64 at 835D. InReHalt Garage
(1964) Ltd [1982] 3All ER 1016 at 1039f (read with 1038b–c) Oliver J observed that
under certain circumstances ‘a test of benefit to the company’ (also understood as ‘the
benefit of the shareholders as a whole’) ‘would be largely meaningless’.
66 ReHalt Garage (1964) Ltd supra note 65.
67 Mills v Mills (1938) 60 CLR 150 at 164 as quoted with approval inHoward Smith
Ltd v Ampol Petroleum supra note 64 at 835F; andMcGuire v Ralph McKay Ltd (1987) 5
ACLC 891 at 894. See also Whitehouse v Carlton Hotel Pty Ltd supra note 64 at 718.
See generallyHenochsberg op cit note 64 at 466: ‘Where directors act in breach of [the
duty to act only under available powers] it is irrelevant whether they believe they do
so in the interests of the company’. The ‘bona fide for the benefit of the company as a
whole’ test was also pertinently rejected inGambotto vWCPLtd (1995) 13ACLC 342
(HC of A) at 348 as inappropriate ‘[i]n the context of a special resolution altering the
articles and giving rise to a conflict of interests and advantages, whether or not it
involves an expropriation of shares’.
68 SarahWorthington ‘Directors’duties, creditors’ rights and shareholder interven-
tions’ (1991) 18Melbourne University LR 121 at 122–3 and 123–4; Nolan op cit note
38 at 3 and 7–13. See also J H Farrar ‘Abuse of power by directors’ (1974) 32 Cam-
bridge LJ 221 at 221 and 224; Michele Kyra Havenga Fiduciary Duties of Company
Directors with Specific regard to Corporate Opportunities (LLD thesis, UNISA, 1995) at 65;
Franz J Ranero ‘Managed investment schemes: The responsible entity’s duty to act
for proper purposes’ (1999) 17C&SLJ 422 at 425 and 427.
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Section 181(1)(a) and (b) of the Australian Corporations Act, 2001, provide
that ‘[a] director or other officer of a corporation must exercise their powers
and discharge their duties . . . in good faith in the best interests of the
corporation; and . . . for a proper purpose’. In a similar vein, s 76(3)(a) and (b)
of the new South African Companies Act 71 of 2008 provide that ‘a director
of a company, when acting in that capacity, must exercise the powers and
perform the functions of a director . . . in good faith and for a proper purpose
(and) in the best interests of the company’.
(c) The concept of ‘good faith (bona fides)’
With the development of the proper purpose doctrine, it also became
apparent that the role concepts like ‘good faith (bona fides)’ and ‘honesty’
played in the past could not maintain their prominence. As a general rule, it
was said that the courts will not second-guess the decisions taken by directors
as part of powers conferred upon them by the articles, as long as, prima facie,
the powers have been exercised within the limits of the powers conferred
upon the organs and bona fide, as well as honestly. When one looks at this
statement, it seems as if the only way in which shareholders can challenge the
decisions of directors taken under powers conferred upon them by the
articles is on the basis that the power was exercised outside the limits of the
power conferred upon them, mala fide or dishonestly.69
It is however submitted that there is just one consideration; namely,
whether the power was exercised for a proper or permissible purpose. Mala
fides and dishonesty only serve to indicate that the power was not exercised
for a proper or permissible purpose. In this sense bona fide conduct is defined
in terms of the purpose for which the power was conferred, but the term
bona fide could, of course, be defined in many other ways.70 However, none
of these closer descriptions of bona fides brings us any nearer to a workable
69 S J NaudéDie Regsposisie van die Maatskappydirekteur met besondere verwysing na die
Interne Maatskappyverband (1970) at 111, under the main heading that directors must
exercise their powers bona fide, observes as follows on the concept of ‘honesty’: ‘Sy
vertrouensposisie bring mee dat elke direkteur eerlik moet wees in sy optrede as
direkteur. Dit is ’n subjektiewe verpligting wat in ’n dikwels ingewikkelde praktiese
regsverkeer nagekom moet word. Hoewel die basiese vraag is of die direkteur inder-
daad eerlik was, word eerlikheid gewoonlik aanvaar indien hul optrede dié was van
eerlike sakelui.’ (Naudé’s emphasis.) See generally R C Nolan ‘The proper purpose
doctrine and company directors’ in BarryAK Rider (ed) The Realm of Company Law:
A Collection of Papers in Honour of Professor Leonard Sealy — S J Berwin Professor of
Corporate Law at the University of Cambridge (1998) at 8. See also RossW Parsons ‘The
director’s duty of good faith’ (1967) 5 Melbourne University LR 395 at 417; and Sealy
op cit note 62 at 269 regarding the fact that directors must act ‘honestly’.
70 See Rogers op cit note 52 at 209 and 210. Rogers is faced with the classic
dilemma — just when it is thought that the meaning of bona fide is captured (see at
210), its illusory nature would become apparent and then further qualifications
become inevitable (see 210 where she must qualify that ‘[a]cting bona fide also
requires that . . .’. In actual fact, any type of consideration that could reflect negatively
on directors’ intentions, the way in which they have exercised their powers, the result
that was achieved by their actions etc could possibly indicate that they have not acted
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way of determining when the acts of directors should be set aside because
they have not acted bona fide. Developments in this area of company law
have led to the recognition that there was a shift from a requirement that
directors must exercise their powers bona fide, to a requirement that they
must exercise their powers for proper or permissible purposes.71
(d) Concept of ‘honesty’
The prominence given to the concept of ‘honesty’ expected of directors in
the past is very well illustrated by a classic contribution of The Honourable
Sir Douglas Menzies in the 1959 Australian Law Journal.72 Australia was the
first common law jurisdiction that included the word ‘honesty’ as part of the
general statutory civil law duties of directors. This was done in 1958 when
the standards of care and diligence expected of directors were taken up in
company law legislation for the first time.73 Section 107 of the Victoria
Companies Act, 1958 provided as follows: ‘107(1) A director shall at all times
act honestly and use reasonable diligence in the discharge of the duties of his
office’ (emphasis supplied).
The words, ‘[a] director shall at all times act honestly’, remained part of
several later sections in Australian company law legislation setting out the
civil law standards of care and diligence expected of directors.74 However, in
1992 the civil standards of care and diligence were amended, and the word
‘honesty’ was removed as a civil standard of care and diligence expected of
directors.75 This is still the case today in Australia, where s 180(1) of the
bona fide — it is impossible and undesirable to make lists of such considerations and
also undesirable to try to define bona fides too closely.
71 See R PAustin and I MRamsay Ford’s Principles of Corporations Law 13 ed (2007)
p 369 para 8.200n1, but note the incorrect reference to Sealy’s article (the reference
should have been to Mon ULR, not MULR). Cf Sealy op cit note 62 at 267–8. For
earlier views on this issue see J R Birds ‘Proper purposes as a head of directors’ duties’
(1974) 37MLR 580 at 583. At 580–1 Birds gives an excellent summary of the differ-
ent doctrines at play in this area.
72 The Honourable Sir Douglas Menzies ‘Company directors’ (1959) 33 The Aus-
tralian LJ 156 at 157–9. For a later analysis of the duty of honesty, see M J Whincop
‘Directors’ statutory duties of honesty and propriety’ in Ian M Ramsay (ed) Corporate
Governance and the Duties of Company Directors (1997) 125 at 127–9 and Michael J
Whincop ‘An economic analysis of the criminalisation and content of directors’
duties’ (1996) 24Australian Business LR 273 at 282–4.
73 Company Directors’Duties — Report on the Social and Fiduciary Duties and Obliga-
tions of CompanyDirectors (CooneyReport) (1989) p 24 para 3.15.
74 Section 124 of the Australian Uniform Companies Acts, 1961; s 229 of the
Australian Companies Act, 1981 (Cth); s 232(2)–(4) of the Australian Corporations
Act, 1989 (Cth). See J CassidyCorporations Law: Text and Essential Cases 2 ed (2008) 4
for an explanation how theAustralian Companies Act 1981 (Cth) applied and how it
was adopted by each state. See http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/num_act/
ca1981107/s1.html for the Australian Companies Act 89 of 1981 (ACT), which
applied in theAustralian Capital Territory.
75 s 11 of the Australian Corporate Law Reform Act, 1992 (Cth), amending
s 232(4) to read as follows: ‘In the exercise of his or her powers and the discharge of
his or her duties, an officer of a corporation must exercise the degree of care and
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Corporations Act, 2001 provides that ‘[a] director or other officer of a
corporation must exercise their powers and discharge their duties with the
degree of care and diligence that a reasonable person would exercise if they:
(a) were a director or officer of a corporation in the corporation’s circum-
stances; and (b) occupied the office held by, and had the same responsibilities
within the corporation as, the director or officer’.
In SouthAfrica, there is also no statutory civil obligation on directors to act
‘honestly’. The reason is probably that the statutory civil obligation provision
in the South African Companies Act 71 of 2008 has been influenced by the
Australian approach, as will become apparent when s 180(1) of theAustralian
CorporationsAct, 2001 is compared with s 76(3)(c) of the new SouthAfrican
Companies Act 71 of 2008. Section 76(3)(c) of the new South African
Companies Act only provides that: ‘A director of a company, when acting in
that capacity, must exercise the powers and perform the functions of director
with the degree of care, skill and diligence that may reasonably be expected
of a person (i) carrying out the same functions in relation to the company as
those carried out by that director; and (ii) having the general knowledge, skill
and experience of that director.’
The reason for dealing with these developments is to illustrate how things
have changed over time. The concept of ‘honesty’ was often used in close
proximity to the requirement that directors must act ‘in good faith (bona
fide) and in the best interests of the company as a whole’, while in a
jurisdiction like Australia it is nowadays used as a yardstick to determine
whether directors committed a criminal offence by acting dishonestly.76
diligence that a reasonable person in a like position in a corporation would exercise in
the corporation’s circumstances.’ See also Explanatory Memorandum to the Corpo-
rate LawReformAct, 1992.
76 See s 184(2) and (3) of theAustralian CorporationsAct, 2001, reading as follows:
‘Use of position— directors, other officers and employees
(2) A director, other officer or employee of a corporation commits an offence if
they use their position dishonestly:
(a) with the intention of directly or indirectly gaining an advantage for
themselves, or someone else, or causing detriment to the corporation; or
(b) recklessly as to whether the use may result in themselves or someone else
directly or indirectly gaining an advantage, or in causing detriment to the
corporation.
Use of information— directors, other officers and employees
(3) A person who obtains information because they are, or have been, a director
or other officer or employee of a corporation commits an offence if they use the
information dishonestly:
(a) with the intention of directly or indirectly gaining an advantage for
themselves, or someone else, or causing detriment to the corporation; or
(b) recklessly as to whether the use may result in themselves or someone else
directly or indirectly gaining an advantage, or in causing detriment to the
corporation.’
See generally G F K Santow ‘Codification of directors’ duties’ (1999) 73 The
Australian LJ 336 at 346 regarding the implications for codification of criminal
sanctions.
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There is no similar provision in the new South African Companies Act 71 as
it has been decriminalised, which means that the common law approach to
‘honesty’ as civil standard may still apply in South Africa.77 It goes without
saying that ‘honesty’ is expected of directors, but the Australian experience
did show that it created challenging problems to prove when directors
breached a statutory civil standard of ‘honesty’ without showing that the
directors acted dishonestly.
IV PERSPECTIVES AND CONCLUSIONS
Having worked through several of the older English cases, one is struck by
how the courts laid down basic and practically-oriented rules which seem to
have served company law well. However, things have moved on and
company law has become more complex. Professor Len Sealy puts things in
perspective:
‘Few things in company law are as simple as they used to be. . . . We have
inherited from our fathers some well-worn and fairly simplistic rules and
concepts, largely laid down a hundred years or so ago in the English courts of
chancery; and with these we have been able to make do, aided by a little
adaptation and fudging, for much of the present century. But it is becoming
apparent that we cannot rely on yesterday’s law for much longer; and some
major shifts are already perceptively under way, both in the rules and concepts
being used, and in judicial attitudes and techniques.’78
These words of Sealy provide some explanation for the fact that it has been
a really challenging process to identify trends and extract rules from cases
decided over a period of almost 200 years, and to understand the true reasons
why the courts developed those rules. Part of the complexity is because the
same rules were expressed differently and were adopted for reasons that are
not necessarily reconcilable.
One consolation for the difficulties experienced in reconciling the
different reasons provided by the courts to justify the application of some
apparently fundamental rules of internal company governance is found in a
striking observation made by Professor L A Zadeh of Berkley, which
Professor John Farrar uses to explain what is meant by the ‘principle of
incompatibility’:
‘Stated informally, the essence of this principle (‘‘principle of incompatibility’’)
is that as the complexity of a system increases, our ability to make precise and
yet significant statements about its behaviour diminishes until a threshold is
reached, beyond which precision and significance (or relevance) become
almost mutually exclusive characteristics.’79
This appears to be completely true of the complex area of judge-made
internal company law rules developed over approximately 200 years.
77 See the cases referred to in notes 52 and 54 above.
78 Sealy op cit note 62 at 265.
79 J H Farrar ‘Report on modernising Australian corporation law’ 1992 (August)
Business Council Bulletin 13.
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Fortunately, there were some admirable attempts made by legislatures to
simplify and demystify some of the rules by providing guidance in company
and corporation legislation. However, the fascinating thing is that we can
hardly escape the past: when the courts are required to interpret comparable
provisions in modern company law legislation, the courts will of necessity
have to go back to where the current statutory rules originated. It is therefore
even in the modern context of considerable importance for us to discuss and
analyse these older cases.
THE JUDGE-MADE RULE OF NON-INTERFERENCE 327
